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To Share or not to Share? Institutional Exchange
of Cadaver Kidneys in Denmark
SØREN BAK-JENSEN*
Kidney transplantations are about exchanges. Grafts are moved from dead bodies to
living ones in return for gratitude and meaning; between friends and family members out
of, or in hope of, affection; and between strangers for philanthropic or pecuniary reasons.
1
These exchanges raise legal, psychological, ethical, and philosophical questions, and
kidney transplantations owe their high visibility as much to the ongoing debates about
these issues as to their therapeutic qualities. Consequently, exchanges like these have
received much attention from scholars, stressing how kidney transplantations, along with
other kinds of organ transplantations, involve society in a unique way. Rene ´e Fox and
Judith Swazey, pioneers in the sociological study of kidney transplantations, asserted in
1978 that the importance of renal replacement therapies ‘‘lies as much in their social and
cultural significance as in their medical and surgical value’’, thus announcing a broad
perspective on the significance of kidney transplantations that continues to dominate non-
medical research in the field to this day.
2
But kidney transplantations also involve exchanges on a different level. Jeffrey Prottas
reminds us that ‘‘before they go to patients, organs go to transplant teams and hospitals’’.
3
Doctors and transplant centres involved at this level hold strong vested interests in how
organs are distributed, and exchanges at the institutional level are thus potentially as
problematic as exchanges on a broader societal level. Prottas identifies two different
ways of allocating organs for transplantation. In the first case, organs are distributed
according to general criteria accepted by a group of transplant centres and are offered
to the most suitable recipient within the network of cooperating centres. In such a system,
clinicians in local hospitals have little formal influence on the allocation of grafts, and
authority lies primarily with regional or national organ allocation agencies. In the second
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2Fox and Swazey, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 376;
idem, Spare parts: organ replacement in American
society, New York, Oxford University Press, 1992.
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23case, organs are distributed according to criteria set up by individual transplant centres.
Such a system does not preclude the sharing of organs between different hospitals, but,
since decisions about allocation are primarily made by local clinicians, there will be a
tendency to offer grafts to local patients.
4 Just as public and political feelings about the
exchange of organs vary a great deal culturally and historically, medical attitudes towards
kidney allocation at an institutional level have shifted over time, and both ways of allocat-
ing organs can be identified in the history of kidney transplantation.
In this article, I shall look at the history of institutional kidney allocation in Denmark, and
more precisely at the background of some important changes that took place in the 1980s.
5
The first kidney transplantation in Denmark was carried out in 1964.
6 In 1969, Danish
doctors were central in the establishment of Scandiatransplant, a kidney allocation orga-
nization servingtheNordiccountries.Transplantcentrescommittedthemselvestooffering
the kidneys they might procure to the most suitable recipient in the region, with tissue type
match being the most important allocation criterion. With four transplant centres and the
world’s highest transplantation rate for most of the 1970s, Denmark was the main receiver
of kidneys in Scandiatransplant, and Danish transplant centres relied heavily on the
cooperation with other Nordic centres.
7 In 1971, almost 75 per cent of all donor kidneys
in this region were exchanged from one hospital to another through Scandiatransplant, and
the exchange rate fluctuated around 50 per cent for the next decade. In the early 1980s, this
kind of cooperation and the reliance upon histocompatibility came under pressure as more
organs were used in the centre where they were procured. Only 15 per cent of all kidneys
were exchanged between transplant centres in 1985, and that has remained the average.
8
Scandiatransplantperformed a series ofrevisions of exchange criteria, all pointingtowards
adecreaseinregionalkidneyexchange.KidneytransplantationinDenmarkthuswentfrom
being regional to being predominantly local in scope.
The Danish case has many similarities with developments in other countries in western
Europe, which also generally went through a shift from a regional to a local, or from an
inter-institutional to an intra-institutional, outlook in kidney exchange.
9 During the 1970s,
most European transplant centres participated in regional kidney exchange organizations
4 Prottas, op. cit., note 3 above.
5Since kidneys from living donors are only rarely
exchangedbetweentransplantcentres,myfocusinthe
rest of this article is exclusively on the allocation of
kidneys from deceased donors. Systematic
institutional exchange of kidneys from living donors
has been suggested, see, for example, Ejvind Kemp,
Jørn Giese, and Paul Peter Leyssac, Clinical
transplantation, xenotransplantation and stem cell
medicine, Copenhagen, Munksgaard, 2003,
pp. 18–20; E S Woodle, ‘A history of living donor
transplantation: from twins to trades’, Transplant.
Proc., 2003, 35: 901–2.
6The history of kidney transplantations in
Denmark is presented in Eva Bundegaard, Danske
nyretransplantationer: om pionerer og idealister,
Copenhagen, Dansk Nefrologisk Selskab, 1999. For a
comparative overview of developments in different
European countries, see Michael A Bos, The diffusion
of heart and liver transplantation across Europe,
London, King’s Fund Centre, 1991.
7Jørn Hess Thaysen, Dialyse og
nyretransplantation. Organisation af behandling.
Indberetning nr. 3 fra sundhedsstyrelsens dialyse og
nyretransplantationsudvalg, Copenhagen,
Sundhedsstyrelsen, 1980, p. 30.
8Melvin Madsen, et al., ‘Application of human
leukocyte antigen matching in the allocation of
kidneys from cadaveric organ donors in the Nordic
countries’, Transplantation, 2004, 77: 621–3; Melvin
Madsen, ‘Scandiatransplant: Nordic collaboration in
organ transplantation’, in S A Birkeland (ed.),
Transplantation in Denmark, Odense, The Danish
Society for Transplantation, 1997, pp. 76–83.
9In contrast, transplant centres in the USA went
throughsomewhatoppositedevelopmentduringthose
24
Søren Bak-Jensensuch as Eurotransplant, established in 1967, which served as a model for Scandiatransplant
and was soon followed by organizations like France-Transplant and UK Transplant.
10 In
the 1980s exchange criteria were revised and loosened, and the kidney exchange organiza-
tions came to occupy a more marginal role in the allocation of organs.
11 The history of
institutional kidney allocation in Denmark might thus serve as a case study for develop-
ments in Europe more generally. Such a comparative perspective is beyond the scope of
this article, but I will continually point out how the Danish case relates to more general
developments, both in order to encourage a comparative study of historical practices of
organ allocation in different countries, and because events in Denmark were closely
connected to and influenced by international discussions.
The Danish history may also, however, display particularities that cannot be found
elsewhere. Geographically, Denmark is a small country with a well-developed infrastruc-
ture, and thus suited for nationwide transportation of organs. Politically, the provision of
health care services on the basis of equal access is seen as a central task for the national
government. This is true for most European countries, but the Danish and other Scandi-
navian populations have demanded more wide-reaching public control over the workings
ofthe health caresystem.Michael Bosarguesthat,inEurope,kidney transplantationswere
generally introduced and organized with little involvement from health authorities.
12 Yet
the Danish state took an early and strong interest in the regulation and planning of kidney
replacement therapies and was able to influence developments through control of financial
means. New technologies were thus introduced in an environment of stronger central
control than was the case elsewhere. Also, the change from regional to local allocation
of kidneys has been more remarkable in Denmark than in central or western European
countries.Thecriteriaofhistocompatibilityforkidneyallocationwasembracedstronglyin
the Nordic countries in the 1970s. Yet today, Scandiatransplant is one of the organ
sameyears,withmorekidneysbeingexchangedinthe
late 1980s than in the 1970s, where the centres
procured organs almost exclusively for their own use.
Prottas,op.cit.,note3above,p.6;AlanTingandLeah
Bennett Edwards, ‘Human leukocyte antigen in the
allocation of kidneys from cadaveric donors in the
United States’, Transplantation, 2004, 77: 610–33.
See also Guenter B Risse, Mending bodies, saving
souls: a history of hospitals, New York, Oxford
University Press, 1999, pp. 571–2.
10Rudolph Pichlmayr, ‘10 Jahre Eurotransplant.
R€ uckblick, Gegenwart und Zukunft von
Transplantationen’, Fortschritte der Medizin, 1977,
95: 2789; Jon J van Rood, ‘The Eurotransplant story.
Part 1: The beginning’, Dialysis & Transplantation,
1982, 11: 515–20; J A van der Does, ‘The
Eurotransplant story. Part 2: 1967, the year
Eurotransplant started’, Dialysis & Transplantation,
1982, 11: 520–5; H M A Schippers, ‘The
Eurotransplant story. Part 3: The first years of the
Eurotransplant Foundation’, Dialysis &
Transplantation,1982,11:525–8;BernardCohenand
Guido G Persijn, ‘Twenty-five years of
eurotransplant: a truly European collaboration’,
Clinical Transplants, 1992, 109–18; Ilias I N
Doxiadis, et al., ‘It takes six to boogie: allocating
cadaver kidneys in Eurotransplant’, Transplantation,
2004, 77: 615–17; Jean Dausset, ‘L’association
France-Transplant’, Nouvelle Presse Me ´dicale, 1972,
1: 2247; idem, ‘The HLA adventure’, in P I Terasaki
(ed.), History of HLA: ten recollections, Los Angeles,
UCLA Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1990, pp. 1–17, on
p. 8; Odile Burrus, ‘France-Transplant’, Revue de
l’Infirmi  ere,1989,7:59–63.SeealsoGaukeKootstra,
‘The history of organ donation and sharing’, in
N S Hakim and V E Papalois (eds), History of organ
and cell transplantation, London, Imperial College
Press, 2003, pp. 55–63.
11Ingo Braun and Bernward Joerges, How to
recombine large technical systems: the case of
European organ transplantation, Berlin,
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin f€ ur Sozialforschung,
1993,pp.27–9;Doxiadis,etal.,op.cit.,note10above;
Lars U Lamm, A report on the central organisation of
transplantation in three European regions, The
Nordic Transplantation Committee and The Nordic
Council of Ministers, 1988, p. 19.
12Bos, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 77.
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Institutional Exchange of Cadaver Kidneys in Denmarkexchange organizations that has gone furthest towards abandoning tissue typing as an
exchange criterion, and Danish transplant centres now enjoy a high degree of freedom in
how they chose to allocate kidneys.
13 It is not my purpose here to account for how these
particularities may have resulted in a special way of organizing kidney transplantations in
Denmark. I mention them in order to emphasize the limits of the analysis I present, and to
stress how comparative studies may enrich our knowledge of the history of kidney sharing.
Why did Regional Kidney Exchange Decrease?
Developments in kidney exchange in Scandiatransplant, and indeed in any other
European kidney exchange organization, have not so far been the subject of detailed
historical analysis. Overviews of the historical background of kidney exchange in the
Nordic countries can be found in presentations by doctors involved in Scandiatransplant,
and they generally point to the advent of cyclosporine, a new immunosuppressant drug
introduced in the early 1980s, as the reason for the drop in exchange rates.
14 Cyclosporine
proved more effective in preventing acute graft rejection than previous immunosuppres-
sive regimes, thus making kidney transplantations much safer. Just as importantly, cyclo-
sporine assured prolonged graft survival even in cases of poor tissue type match, thus
allowing not only renal transplantations but also other kinds of whole-organ replacements
to be carried out on a larger scale. Developments in immunosuppression are also seen as
central in the international literature on the history of kidney transplantation, where
cyclosporine is often perceived as introducing a new era, the ‘‘Cyclosporine Era’’, in
which organ transplantation came of age.
15 The introduction of cyclosporine and the
diminished importance of histocompatibility in organ allocation is also seen to have
undermined the rationality of tissue typing and thus led to a drop in regional kidney
exchange and a more marginal role for organizations like Scandiatransplant.
16
A few studies have tried to move beyond this pharmacological determinism by point-
ing to how preferences for regional organ exchange on the basis of histocompatibility
testingwasinfluencedbymoregeneralsocio-culturalfactors.IlanaLo ¨wyarguesthatwhile
institutional organ exchange was broadly accepted by European transplant teams,
American counterparts were generally sceptical, with controversy over the value of histo-
compatibility testing raging across the Atlantic for most of the 1970s. Since no conclusive
statistical evidence regarding the clinical value of tissue typing was presented during this
period, Lo ¨wy suggests that the importance of equality in western European approaches to
13In this respect, Scandiatransplant may be
pointing the way for the future of many organ
exchange organizations, see Peter J Morris and
AnthonyPMonaco,‘HLAintheallocationofcadaver
kidneys:aglobalperspective’,Transplantation,2004,
77: 608.
14Audun Flatmark, ‘Scandiatransplant 20 years’,
Tissue Antigens, 1989, 34: 30–4, on p. 33; Madsen,
et al., op. cit., note 8 above, p. 621.
15Leslie Brent, A history of transplantation
immunology, San Diego, Academic Press, 1997,
pp. 315–18. See also Nicholas L Tilney, Transplant:
from myth to reality, New Haven, Yale University
Press, 2003, pp. 229–43; Thomas E Starzl,
The puzzle people: memoirs of a transplant surgeon,
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992, pp. 209–14.
16IngoBraun,G€ unterFeuerstein,andClaudiavon
Grote-Janz, ‘Organ-Technik. Technik und
Wissenschaft im Organtransplantationswesen’,
Soziale Welt, 1991, 42: 445–72, on p. 457; Braun and
Joerges, op. cit., note 11 above, p. 26.
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Søren Bak-Jensenpublic health care provision and the existence of centralized health care systems made
regional organ exchange through organizations like Eurotransplant and Scandiatransplant
‘‘quasi-natural’’ in this part of the world.
17 This view is supported by Anne-Marie Moulin,
who also points to how the more decentralized health care system in the USA gave rise to
greater local variation in the organization of kidney transplantations.
18
The analyses by Lo ¨wy and Moulin point towards more recent studies on the nature of
medical innovations, for example cyclosporine, and their relation to changes in medicine.
These studies treat innovations as historically contingent and see the successful diffusion
(or lack thereof) of new ideas or technologies as influenced by social and cultural forces,
and not as a product of inherent and objective qualities of specific ways of handling or
thinking about health and disease.
19 A whole range of relevant contexts for the under-
standing of medical innovations have been suggested, with many researchers indicating
how general cultural values or social characteristics play a central role in the evaluation of
progress and innovation in health care.
20
The perspective of how overall political and cultural attitudes inform the distribution of
donor organs is an important one, and one that has received increasing attention.
21 But it is
also clear that the perspective of general norms and values, as employed by Lo ¨wy and
Moulin in their studies of European kidney exchange, presents problems if we wish to
explain developments in this area. The focus on fundamental attitudes towards health care
provision makes it difficult for Moulin and Lo ¨wy to understand the dynamics behind the
changesthatoccurredintheorganizationofEuropeankidneytransplantationsinthe1980s.
By referring to values supposedly common to western European countries, Lo ¨wy and
Moulin homogenize the attitudes of transplant teams. This does not correspond with the
information also supplied in their studies that differences did actually exist between
European transplant centres and, more importantly, that attitudes towards regional kidney
exchangevariedbetweendifferentkindsofdoctors.Historicalaccountsbymedicaldoctors
involved in kidney transplants in the 1970s will usually stress a conflict between immu-
nologists and clinicians over the value of histocompatibility testing and hence the ration-
ality of regional kidney exchange. According to Jean Dausset, one of the pioneers of
histocompatibilitytestingandthefounderofFrance-Transplant,thescepticismofsurgeons
was one of the major obstacles to regional kidney exchange.
22 This conflict between
17Ilana Lo ¨wy, ‘Tissue groups and cadaver kidney
sharing: socio-cultural aspects of a medical
controversy’, Int. J. Technol. Assess. Health Care,
1986, 2: 195–218, on p. 208.
18Anne-Marie Moulin, Le dernier langage de la
me ´decine. Histoire de l’immunologie de Pasteur au
Sida, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1991,
pp. 217–18. See also Kootstra, op. cit., note 10 above,
p. 62.
19See the contributions in John V Pickstone (ed.),
Medical innovations in historical perspective,
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1992; Ilana Lo ¨wy (ed.),
Medicine and change: historical and sociological
studies of medical innovation, Montrouge, John
Libbey Eurotext, and Paris, INSERM, 1993; and
Jennifer Stanton (ed.), Innovations in health and
medicine, London, Routledge, 2002.
20JohnVPickstone,‘Introduction’,Pickstone,op.
cit., note 19 above, pp. 1–16; Ilana Lo ¨wy,
‘Introduction: Medicine and change’, Lo ¨wy, op. cit.,
note 19 above, pp. 1–20; Jennifer Stanton,
‘Introduction: On theory and practice’, Stanton, op.
cit., note 19 above, pp. 1–18.
21Prottas, op. cit., note 3 above; Christian Hiesse,
Fabienne Pessione, and Didier Houssin, ‘The case to
abandon human leukocyte antigen matching for
kidney allocation: would it be wise to throw out the
babywiththebathwater?’,Transplantation,2004,77:
623–6.
22Jean Dausset, Clin d’oeil a ` la vie. La grande
aventure HLA, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1998, pp. 178–9.
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Institutional Exchange of Cadaver Kidneys in Denmarkspecialisms is noted by Lo ¨wy and Moulin, but they do not discuss the way in which
disagreements at this level may qualify the view that more general,‘‘non-scientific’’ socio-
cultural factors determined the attitudes of transplant teams.
23 Also, since basic attitudes
towards access to health care services did not undergo changes that can be related to
changes in attitudes towards kidney allocation, cyclosporine acquires a determining role in
their analyses. According to Moulin, ‘‘cyclosporine made the search for compatibility at
any cost a thing of the past’’ and thus changed the whole problematic of kidney trans-
plantations.
24 And Lo ¨wy, writing just when the changes were happening, speculated that
a generalized use of cyclosporine would create a demand for new criteria of kidney
allocation and that transplant centres might ‘‘liberate themselves from the constraints
characteristic of centralized organ distribution’’.
25
In what follows, I wish to moderate the view that changes in institutional kidney
exchange were influenced primarily by innovations in immunosuppression and by general
socio-cultural values, by applying a third analytical perspective to the analysis of kidney
exchange in Denmark. My contention is that even though the rationality of regional kidney
exchange was dominant during the 1970s and Danish transplant centres were operating
within an immunological conceptualization of kidney transplantations through their invol-
vement in Scandiatransplant, other ways of thinking about and practising kidney alloca-
tion existed. Many clinicians, mainly surgeons and nephrologists, were critical of the
reliance upon histocompatibility testing. They felt that their priorities for organ allocation
were overlooked in the framework of Scandiatransplant. Tensions concerning these issues
grewbetween immunologistsand clinicians andculminatedinthe early 1980sina revision
of the Scandiatransplant cooperation towards diminished regional kidney exchange.
Cyclosporine played an important part in this change by offering an alternative to tissue
type matching, butalsobecausecritics ofScandiatransplantpresentedthe new druginsuch
a way that it justified their viewpoints. The new immunosuppressant, I argue, was thus to a
certain degree shaped by a professional struggle between immunologists and clinicians.
My approach is thus in line with several other studies on medical innovations that empha-
size the importance of competition and struggles between different groups of health care
professionals.
26
My analysis draws on studies of articles and books published by Danish medical doctors
from the mid-1960s onwards, along with archival material and interviews with persons
involved in kidney transplantations in Denmark in the 1970s. These last two groups of
sources allow a view of other conceptualizations of kidney transplantations than the
dominant one of immunology. I am therefore able to provide a more complex picture
ofattitudestowardskidney exchangethan theonedrawnup bystudiesrelyingprimarilyon
published material.
27 I will begin by presenting the 1970s’ system of regional kidney
See also Starzl, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 118–24;
Tilney, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 138–9.
23Lo ¨wy, op. cit., note 17 above, p. 204.
24Moulin, op. cit., note 18 above, p. 223: ‘‘la
cyclosporine a rejete ´ dans le passe ´ historique la
recherche de la compatibilite ´ a ` tout prix’’.
25Ilana Lo ¨wy, ‘Choix scientifiques et choix
e ´thiques dans le traitement de la maladie re ´nale
terminale’, Social Science Information/ Information
sur les sciences sociales, 1987, 26: 577–605, on
p. 592: ‘‘se de ´barrasser des contraintes propres a ` une
distribution centralise ´e d’organes’’.
26Stanton, op. cit., note 20 above, p. 4.
27Lo ¨wy also conducted interviews with
participants in the debate over tissue typing, but she
seems to favour written sources for the kind of
28
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conflict of the early 1980s and the role played by cyclosporine.
Regional Kidney Exchange
On Sunday evening 21 November 1971, a blizzard dropped a thick layer of snow over
Denmark. During the night, the victim of a traffic accident was brought into the National
Hospital in Copenhagen with severe head injuries. The patient was connected to a venti-
lator as there was no spontaneous breathing, and it was quickly established that the
patient’s central nervous system had been fatally damaged. Thus artificially maintaining
circulation and organ function, but with no hope of returning to life, the patient was a
potential organ donor. A blood sample was brought to the hospital’s newly established
tissue type laboratory where a histocompatibility test was carried out. The information was
then faxed to the central office of Scandiatransplant at A ˚rhus Municipal Hospital in the
western part of the country. There, the donor tissue type was matched against the database
of all patients in the Nordic countries waiting for a kidney transplantation.
The most suitable recipient turned out to be a young boy from the north-western corner
of Denmark. The kidney was an A-match, meaning that no tissue type incompatibilities
could be identified between recipient and donor. As the boy’s parents were only too happy
to accept the kidney offered to their son, the logistical challenge of bringing the recipient
and the donor organ together in a transplant centre began. Overland travel was impossible
because of weather conditions, so a Navy rescue helicopter was assigned to pick up the
recipient near his home. The helicopter made a stop at the boy’s dialysis centre in Aalborg
for his medical record, and then continued on to the nearest transplant centre at A ˚rhus
Municipal Hospital. The donor kidney arrived by helicopter from Copenhagen. Shortly
after midnight on 24 November, the kidney had been implanted in the new host through an
uneventful operation.
28
This story illustrates some important characteristics of regional kidney exchange in the
1970s, not just in Denmark but generally. Exchanging kidneys required a large and diverse
organizational network aimed at bringing people, organs, and information together from
considerable distances, millions of inhabitants, and several transplant centres. This com-
plicated and bureaucratic way of allocating donor kidneys was guided by, and justified
through, a belief in the beneficial clinical effects of matching donors and recipients
according to tissue types. And finally, tissue type laboratories and the immunologists
working in them played the central role in the allocation process.
In 1971, the central position of immunology in kidney transplantations was of recent
date. According to Moulin, immunology became the dominant language in organ trans-
plantations in the mid-1960s, and subsequent research efforts focused mainly on two
questions she examines, see op. cit., note 17 above,
pp. 196–7.
28‘Med helikopter for at fa ˚ ny nyre’, Jyllands-
Posten, 24 Nov. 1971, p. 1; ‘Til hospital med
helikopter’, Thisted Dagblad, 24 Nov. 1971, p. 5;
‘Dreng fra Ty blev fløjet til en ny nyre’, Aalborg
Stiftstidende, 24 Nov. 1971, p. 3. Arne W S Sørensen,
interviewbyauthor,14Dec.2005.Sørensen(b.1926),
a nephrologist, headed the dialysis department at
Aalborg Sygehus Syd from 1970 to 1995.
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Institutional Exchange of Cadaver Kidneys in Denmarkimmunological roads towards better clinical results: one was the prevention of rejection
through immunosuppressant drugs; the other was histocompatibility testing as a basis for
donor-recipient selection.
29 Research in immunosuppression yielded the first practical
results.Experimentswithfull-bodyradiationoftherecipientprovedeffectiveinthenarrow
sense of preventing rejection, but the sub-lethal doses of X-rays used had severe side
effects, and the procedure was difficult to control. Extirpation of antibody-producing
tissues like the spleen and thymus as well as drainage of lymphocyte-rich lymph from
the thoracic duct yielded mixed results.
30 Real progress came in the shape of chemical
immunosuppressants developed by American and British doctors around1960, resulting in
a combination treatment of antimetabolites and corticosteroids. This immunosuppressant
regime secured a one-year graft survival rate of about 40 per cent, a remarkable improve-
ment at the time, and remained the treatment of choice until the 1980s.
31 The results
encouraged hospitals all over the world to take up renal transplantations,
32 and also
convinced doctors at A ˚rhus Municipal Hospital that the time was right to move towards
a transplantation programme. Their preparations involved experimental transplantations
on pigs as well as study trips to transplant centres in the UK. By early 1964, the team of
doctorsinvolvedwasready,andthefirstkidneytransplantationinDenmarkwasperformed
atA ˚rhusMunicipalHospitalon18April.
33KidneytransplantationsinDenmarkthusbegan
on the basis of advances in immunosuppression. But developments were soon to be
strongly influenced by advances in the identification of tissue types and the possibility
of matching donors and recipients. In 1966, when the transplant team at A ˚rhus Municipal
Hospital published their experiences with their first fourteen kidney transplants, they were
confident ‘‘that the use of selected donors, who differ from the recipient only with respect
to a few leukocyte antigens, yields better clinical results’’.
34
The technology for routine donor-recipient matching according to tissue types was not
available at that time, but expectations of what such a selection programme might bring
were enormous. Since the earliest experiments with kidney transplantations in animals at
the beginning of the twentieth century, it had been clear that tissue transferred between
different species (xenotransplantations) or even between individuals of the same species
(allotransplantations) were invariably rejected, while tissue moved within the same indi-
vidual (autotransplantations), for example a dog’s kidney transplanted to its neck, was
allowed tohealandfunction.
35Experimentswith skingraftsforvictimsofburns duringthe
Second World War by Peter Medawar, and with kidney transplants in dogs by Morten
Simonsen, a young Danish doctor working in Aalborg in the late 1940s, led to the con-
clusion that rejection was an immunological process caused by differences in tissue types
29Moulin, op. cit., note 18 above, pp. 179–80.
30Tilney, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 67–75,
129–32.
31Brent, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 310–15.
32Risse, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 588.
33‘Hvordan det blev muligt at give syge en ny
nyre’, Politiken, 31 May 1964; Bundegaard, op. cit.,
note 6 above, pp. 24–30.
34Flemming Kissmeyer-Nielsen et al.,
‘Nyretransplantation IV. Immunologiske aspekter’,
Ugeskrift for Læger, 1966, 128: 757–69, on p. 766:
‘‘at anvendelsen af udvalgte donorer, der kun afviger
fra recipienten for fa ˚ leukocytantigeners
vedkommende giver bedre kliniske resultater’’.
35Thomas Schlich, Die Erfindung der
Organtransplantation. Erfolg und Scheitern des
chirurgischenOrganersatzes(1880–1930),Frankfurt/
Main, Campus, 1998; Brent, op. cit., note 15 above,
pp. 56–63; Tilney, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 36–43.
30
Søren Bak-Jensenbetween host and graft.
36 These results motivated further interest in transplantation immu-
nology. In 1957, the medical faculty at the University of Copenhagen set up an Institute of
Transplantation and Immunobiology with Morten Simonsen as director. According to
Simonsen, this novel and not easily classifiable research area was met with so much
opposition from doctors within other specialities, especially surgeons, that work in the
new institute did not begin until ten years later, in 1967.
37
By that time, transplantation immunology had moved from a marginal position to being
central to kidney transplantations. Matching of donor and recipient according to tissue
antigens was accepted internationally as the road to safer transplantations, and technical
improvements now allowed the identification of such antigens in practice.
38 The search for
specific antigens active in the rejection of foreign tissue had begun in haematology
departments in the late 1950s. Over the next decade, a small group of researchers scattered
in laboratories across the world explored the group of antigens, from 1967 known as the
HL-A and later the HLA (Human Leukocyte Antigen) system, which were believed to be
most important in organ transplantation.
39 In 1964, two American transplant centres
began retrospective and soon after prospective studies of the relationship between
donor-recipient selection according to HLA and the outcome of kidney transplantations.
At this time, it was possible to identify only a small number of antigens in the HLA system
and results from the tests were correspondingly unclear, but with some indication of a
correlation between good matches and prolonged graft survival rates.
40 The studies
spawned a major increase in tissue type testing and in the possibility of matching donors
and recipients. According to the American transplant surgeon Thomas Starzl, who parti-
cipated in the first experiments with donor selection, ‘‘a cottage industry of clinical tissue
typing based on the assumption that matching would have a profound influence on trans-
plantation had sprung up worldwide’’ by 1966.
41 Morten Simonsen was one of the
researchers convinced that tissue typing would bring about a revolution in kidney trans-
plantation. In the Lancet in early 1965, he argued that rejection or acceptance of kidney
grafts was probably determined by a quite simple system of histocompatibility antigens,
comparable to that of the major blood types.
42 Reliable and more sensitive techniques for
tissue type testing still had to be developed if a donor-selection system should become a
practical possibility. And he spurred on research in this area by speculating that ‘‘sero-
logical identification of some—perhaps no more than four to seven—of the strongest
antigens could lead to a radical improvement in the results’’.
43
36Experiments quite similar to Simonsen’s were
carried out simultaneously by William Dempster in
London, see Tilney, op. cit., note 15 above,
pp. 109–12; Brent, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 307,
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J C Melchior, E Andreasen, K Brøchner-Mortensen,
A Gjedde, V Møller-Christensen, and D Trolle (eds),
Københavns Universitet 1479–1979. Det
lægevidenskabelige Fakultet, University of
Copenhagen, 1979, pp. 493–8,
on pp. 496–7.
37Morten Simonsen, ‘Historien om en tom etage’,
UgeskriftforLæger,1964,126:1590–7;idem,op.cit.,
note 36 above, pp. 496–7.
38PaulITerasaki,‘HistoryofHLA:apersonalized
view’, in Terasaki (ed.), op. cit., note 10 above,
pp. 213–69, on pp. 220–1.
39Brent, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 138–42;
Tilney, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 135–9. For ‘‘le
psychodrame’’ of nomenclature, see Dausset, op. cit.,
note 22 above, pp. 104–6.
40Brent, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 153–5.
41Starzl, op. cit., note 15 above, p. 120.
42Morten Simonsen, ‘Strong transplantation
antigens in man’, Lancet, 1965, i: 415–18.
43Ibid., p. 415. In Danish newspapers, Simonsen
also foresaw that organ transplantations might soon
become as simple and predictable as putting a new
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Institutional Exchange of Cadaver Kidneys in DenmarkSimonsen’s statement is a clear example of what Moulin calls the ‘‘HLA-hypothesis’’, the
belief that variation in the HLA-system was sufficiently limited to justify the search for donors
that were compatible with recipients, and that such compatibility would bring about better
clinical results.
44 In the mid-1960s, this hypothesis was spreading from the small commu-
nity of HLA-researchers to transplant teams, and it was to have a huge effect on the future
of kidney transplantations. It focused research efforts on the identification of leukocyte
antigens and it shaped the organization of kidney transplantations since organ exchange
according to tissue types now appeared not only reasonable but even imperative.
45
The HLA-system quickly proved to be much more complicated than envisioned by
Simonsen,witheven themostfrequentHLA-phenotypesbeingpresentinonlyafractionof
the population.
46 But rather than deterring the practical implementation of the HLA-
hypothesis, polymorphism was seen as a problem that could be solved by making the
available pool of potential recipients larger. Jon van Rood, head of the blood bank in
Leiden and a central member of the ‘‘HLA fraternity’’,
47 was the first to bring these
thoughts into practice. At the Third Histocompatibility Workshop held in Turin in
September 1967, he revealed his plans for Eurotransplant, a kidney exchange organiza-
tion that would unite the efforts of tissue type laboratories and transplant teams in
Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg and parts of West Germany in an attempt to supply patients
waiting for transplantation with a well-matched donor kidney.
48 Eurotransplant would
maintainadatabaseoftissuetypeinformationonpatientswaitingforanewkidney.‘‘When
one of the cooperating teams is notified that it will receive a cadaver kidney, the potential
donor can be typed for blood and leukocyte groups; if this team has no suitable recipient a
telephone call to the computer [containing the database] will locate the best-matched
recipient(s) in a matter of minutes’’.
49 The Eurotransplant office in Leiden received its
first cadaver kidney report in October 1967, thus marking the beginning of large-scale
regional kidney exchange.
50
The establishment of Eurotransplant spawned a series of similar initiatives in European
regions. In Denmark, Flemming Kissmeyer-Nielsen, head of the blood bank at A ˚rhus
Municipal Hospital and also a member of the international HLA-research community,
quickly saw the need for a similar organization for the Nordic countries.
51 At the con-
ference in Turin, Kissmeyer-Nielsen presented a modified and easily reproducible test
method well suited to allow cooperation between different tissue type laboratories.
52 Upon
his return, he informed the Committee on Dialysis and Transplantation set up by the
Danish National Board of Health that a regional organization similar to Eurotransplant
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Antigens, 1971, 1: 184–95.
47Brent, op. cit., note 15 above, p. 138.
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cooperation in organ transplantation: Eurotransplant’,
in E S Curtoni, P L Mattiuz, and R M Tosi (eds),
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Munksgaard, 1967, pp. 451–2.
49Ibid., p. 451. See also idem, op. cit., note 10
above.
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Søren Bak-Jensenwas a prerequisite for the effective utilization of cadaver kidneys.
53 In early 1968, he aired
plans for an exchange programme between the transplant centres in Copenhagen and
A ˚rhus, and by August that year his plans also included transplant centres in Sweden
and Norway, with the tissue type laboratory at A ˚rhus Municipal Hospital as the main
centre.
54 Through the autumn, further talks were held between representatives of these
centres, also securing the support of national health care authorities, and in January 1969
the transfer by helicopter of a kidney from Gothenburg to A ˚rhus marked the start of
Scandiatransplant. In 1970, the organization was enlarged to include all the Nordic coun-
tries and, for a few years, also the Hamburg region.
55
Scandiatransplant was an immediate success. During the first two years, 278 out of a
total of 430 transplants were carried out with a kidney transferred from one centre to
another.
56In1971,theexchangeratewascloseto75percent.Thatfigureisstrikinginlight
of the fact that by this time the Scandinavian countries had some of the highest kidney
transplantation rates in the world, with Denmark taking the overall lead.
57 Kidneys that
could not be matched to a suitable recipient in the Nordic countries were exchanged with
Eurotransplant or other organizations,
58 and sometimes with transplant centres in the
USA.
59 Kidney transplantation had become a potentially globalized affair.
The involvement of Danish transplant centres in regional kidney exchange meant that
transplantation became an organizationally very complicated procedure which relied
heavily upon infrastructure, technology, and networks of communication. The backbone
of Scandiatransplant, the database containing tissue type information on all patients
waiting for a kidney transplant in the region, about 200 to begin with but quickly rising
to 600 in 1973, had to be maintained in both a safe and an accessible manner. This was
initially achieved through a punch-card system at the tissue type laboratory at A ˚rhus
Municipal Hospital.
60 In 1974, the registry was moved to a computer which allowed tissue
lymphocytes by flotation’, in Curtoni, Mattiuz, and
Tosi (eds), op. cit., note 48 above, pp. 381–3. On the
importance of this technique for Eurotransplant, see
Jon J van Rood, ‘HLA and I’, Annu. Rev. Immunol.,
1993, 11: 1–28, on pp. 23–4.
53The Steno Institute Library, University of
Aarhus (hereafter SIL), Love, betænkninger,
korrespondancer, mødereferater vedrørende
nyretransplantationer i Danmark 1953–1985, arkiv
efter Jørn Hess Thaysen (hereafter JHT), Flemming
Kissmeyer-Nielsen, ‘Om udvælgelse af patienter til
nyretransplantation’ [1967].
54Flemming Kissmeyer-Nielsen, Transplantation
af menneskelige organer, Copenhagen, Munksgaard,
1968, p. 66. SIL, JHT, Flemming Kissmeyer-Nielsen,
‘Udveksling af organer’, August 1968.
55Flemming Kissmeyer-Nielsen,
‘Vævstypebestemmelser og transplantationer’,
Nordisk Medicin, 1970, 83: 205–8; Bjo ¨rn L
Lindstro ¨m, ‘Nordiskt transplantationssamarbete’,
NordiskMedicin,1970,83:532–4.Seealsoidem,‘The
Scandiatransplant organization’, Annales Chirurgiae
et Gynaecologiae Fenniae, 1973, 62: 175–7; idem,
‘Scandiatransplant and the Nordic committee of
experts on transplantation’, Scand. J. Urol. Nephrol.
Suppl., 1981, 64: 8–11; Flemming Kissmeyer-
Nielsen, Transplantation af menneskelige organer,
Copenhagen, FADL, 1979, p. 69; idem,
‘Scandiatransplant – evolution and development’,
Transplant.Proc.,1982,14:205–8;Flatmark,op.cit.,
note 14 above.
56Flemming Kissmeyer-Nielsen, et al.,
‘Scandiatransplant: preliminary report of a kidney
exchange program’, Transplant. Proc., 1971, 3:
1019–29, on p. 1022.
57Jørn Hess Thaysen, ‘Indberetning nr. 2 til
Sundhedsstyrelsen fra det under Sundhedsstyrelsen
nedsatteudvalg vedrørende organisationaf dialyse og
nyretransplantationsbehandling i Danmark’, Fra
Sundhedsstyrelsen, 1973, 6: 109–16, on p. 112.
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Institutional Exchange of Cadaver Kidneys in Denmarktype laboratories and transplant centres online access to the database.
61 Initially, the
cooperating centres communicated with the main office in A ˚rhus by telephone, until
telex-machinestookoveraround1971.Effectiveandspeedycooperationofmanydifferent
institutions had to be made possible through the standardization of a number of tools
and procedures, ranging from test sera for histocompatibility testing, the test methods
themselves, the reporting of test results, and information on the recipients. The tissue
type laboratory in A ˚rhus was responsible for producing and distributing test sera to the
other tissue type laboratories in order to secure comparable results. For the transportation
of organs, Scandiatransplant relied heavily on the services of commercial airlines, national
airforces,andprivatetaxiplanes.IntheframeworkofScandiatransplant,kidneytransplan-
tations thus became a highly complex and bureaucratic business involving many different
kinds of technologies and institutions. Similar developments towards large and diverse
organizational frameworks for kidney exchange could be seen in other regions in Europe
where exchange organizations were set up.
62
The Politics of Tissue Typing
Kissmeyer-Nielsen admitted that the exchange system put into effect with Scandia-
transplant was both complicated and expensive.
63 But the organization enjoyed support
from many sides. Developments in kidney transplantation attracted much media attention
around 1970, and the focus was usually on the role played by Scandiatransplant and
Kissmeyer-Nielsen.
64 Stories of kidney transports, with their inherent features of
drama, the race against time, and the question of life and/or death, often found their
way to the newspapers.
65 During this period, Kissmeyer-Nielsen became the public
face of kidney transplantation in Denmark, and he used this position to promote the unique
importance of immunology and a regional perspective in organ exchange for the future of
kidney transplantation. Newspapers told of plans for a world-organization for kidney
exchange, and Kissmeyer-Nielsen assured readers of the rationality of such a network:
‘‘With the international cooperation we have, both regarding tissue typing and organ
exchange, we must be getting close to a 100 per cent certainty that the kidney will be
accepted’’.
66 The message was certainly picked up, with one editorial stating that ‘‘thanks
to the fantastic international cooperation recounted by Dr Kissmeyer-Nielsen last Sunday,
histocompatibility tests may now be carried out with such precision that no element of
chance remains when a patient is to receive a cadaver kidney’’.
67
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Søren Bak-JensenIn articles and books aimed both at popular and medical audiences, Kissmeyer-Nielsen
promoted the view that tissue typing together with a large pool of recipients were the main
requirements for positive results in kidney transplantation and that improvements in graft
survival would come from immunology in the shape of more sensitive methods of
donor-recipient selection.
68 Kissmeyer-Nielsen thus became the most prominent advocate
of the HLA-hypothesis in Denmark.
69 But he was far from alone in framing kidney
transplantations this way. Indeed, the National Board of Health’s Committee on Dialysis
and Transplantation, numbering all the senior doctors involved in kidney transplantation
at the time, affirmed the view. In the committee’s first report in 1969, Jørn Hess Thaysen,
head of the nephrological department at the National Hospital and chairman of the com-
mitteefromitsbeginningtotheendin1993,statedthat‘‘regionalcooperation’’onthebasis
of tissue type data was necessary in order to improve the results of cadaver kidney
transplantations.
70
The system of regional organ exchange thus enjoyed the support of powerful actors
in the Danish health care field around 1970. But before we accept this support as no
more than the result of rational surveys of the matter at hand, we should pay attention to
the political aspects of this way of conceptualizing kidney allocation. Moulin argues that
promoting the importance of tissue typing served a strategic purpose since it justified
both the regional kidney exchange organizations and the centrality of tissue type
laboratories and immunologists in the organization of kidney transplantations.
71
Kissmeyer-Nielsen made just such an argument concerning the structure of Scandia-
transplant. He stated that ‘‘even though other factors in some cases influence the choice
of recipient, the tissue types of donor and recipient are the most important, and for that
reason it is natural that the tissue type laboratories in the region, which are the central links
of communication, locate the best suited recipients and establish the necessary contact
between donor- and recipient-centres’’.
72 At the same time, other conceptualizations of
kidney transplantation, alternative modes of organization, along with competing research
foci and medical specialities, were marginalized. For example, Kissmeyer-Nielsen argued
in 1972 that, while the immunological aspects of kidney transplantation continued to pose
the main challenge, ‘‘the surgical-technical problems are largely solved’’.
73 Kissmeyer-
Nielsen thus justified a continuing research focus on immunogenetics while also removing
68Mielche, op. cit., note 64 above; Flemming
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Institutional Exchange of Cadaver Kidneys in Denmarkthe status of transplant surgery as an object of scientific interest.
74 His call for intensified
interest in transplantation immunology did not fall on barren ground. On the recommenda-
tion of the National Board of Health’s Committee on Dialysis and Transplantation, the
Danish parliament decided to support research in dialysis and transplantation through a
special fund of 1 million kroner, to be distributed through the Medical Research Council
in 1969–70. More than 400,000 kroner went to research in transplantation immunology,
whileamere30,000wenttothestudyofsurgicalaspects,morepreciselythefunctioningof
the ureter upon transplantation.
75
The rationality of tissue typing thus guided the way cadaver kidneys were exchanged
in Denmark during the 1970s, and tissue type laboratories occupied the central position in
the complicated network required to make regional kidney exchange work. But even if
immunology and institutional kidney exchange provided the dominant framework for
thinking about transplantation during this period, an alternative favouring local use of
kidneys and less reliance upon histocompatibility existed. In order to identify this alter-
native, we must return to the story of the transplantation given above.
The Alternative of Local Use
The morning after the transplantation at A ˚rhus Municipal Hospital, Flemming
Kissmeyer-Nielsen telephoned Arne W S Sørensen, the nephrologist who had been in
charge of the boy’s dialysis treatment. The patient was doing well, but Kissmeyer-Nielsen
had disturbing news nevertheless. The tissue type information on the telex from Copenha-
gen had been either unclear or misread. In any case, wrong information had been used to
locate the most suitable recipient in the Scandiatransplant database, and it now turned out
that rather than an A-match kidney, the boy had been equipped with a D-match. The donor
kidney had at least two antigens foreign to the recipient. This meant a much lower chance
that the new kidney would function beyond a few weeks or months. Consequently, the boy
would never have been chosen as recipient if the true character of the match had been
known. Little could be done now, however, since Kissmeyer-Nielsen was certainly not
going to suggest that the kidney be removed and given to someone else. But the informa-
tion was important to Sørensen since he would be in charge of the follow-up treatment.
Moresevererejectionepisodescouldnowbeexpectedandthepatientwouldprobablyhave
to endure a heavier immunosuppressant regime.
The new kidney did indeed present problems. Another three operations were required to
attach the ureter properly to the kidney, a common problem in many transplantations, and
the patient did not return home until a month later. But apart from that the kidney worked
74For the argument that the relevance of an object
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thatunanticipated observationsmaycome fromit, see
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Søren Bak-Jensenwell and it continuedto do so for twelve years when chronic rejection set in and it had to be
removed. A period of dialysis followed until the patient received his second kidney
transplantation.
76
The story of how a grossly mismatched kidney graft managed to function and thereby
save the life of a young boy was obviously a happy one, and Kissmeyer-Nielsen must have
been relieved that the faulty selection procedure did not result in acute rejection. But we
may also expect Kissmeyer-Nielsen to have been glad that this part of the story was not
brought to wider attention. Cases showing a lack of correlation between tissue type match
and transplantation outcome not only went directly against Kissmeyer-Nielsen’s scientific
claim that HLA should guide the pairing of donor organ and recipient, they also carried
organizational and professional-political connotations: they undermined the rationality of
regional kidney exchange through organizations like Scandiatransplant, and called into
question the central role played by immunologists and tissue type laboratories in kidney
transplantations and the allocation of organs. In short, such cases suggested an alternative
toregionalkidneyexchange,namelylocaluseofkidneysattheexpenseoftheHLA-match.
ThequestionoftheactualbenefitsofHLAasabasisfororgan allocation hasbeenoneof
the most controversial in the history of kidney transplantation on an international level. At
a conference in The Hague in September 1970, Paul Terasaki, head of the UCLA Tissue
Typing Laboratory, presented results showing little correlation between histocompatibility
and graft survival.
77 Terasaki had pioneered donor selection according to HLA in 1964,
thereby inspiring muchoftheenthusiasmabouttissuetyping.Nowhequestionedthelimits
of this technology. According to Terasaki, however, ‘‘the heretical paper ...was com-
pletely unacceptable to tissue typers’’.
78 Soon after the meeting in The Hague, ‘‘emer-
gency’’ conferences were called by tissue typers, all ending in reaffirmations of the HLA-
hypothesis.
79TheNationalInstitutesofHealth,whichfundedmuchoftheHLA-researchin
the USA, withdrew funding from Terasaki’s laboratory within four months of the con-
ference in The Hague. Further, Terasaki’s paper was the only contribution not included in
the proceedings of the conference.
80
The paper was eventually published in 1971 in the first issue of Tissue Antigens,a
new journal edited by Kissmeyer-Nielsen and serving the growing field of tissue typing.
81
It was, however, preceded by an editorial in which Kissmeyer-Nielsen, ‘‘in order to stress
the undisputable importance of the HL-A system for human transplantation, which is
generally agreed upon by all tissue typers’’, warned of possible sources of error in
Terasaki’s data.
82 Terasaki and his team had challenged the relevance of HLA-typing
directly by saying that since many patients experienced good transplantation results even
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Institutional Exchange of Cadaver Kidneys in Denmarkwith mismatched kidneys, ‘‘a more suitable means by which successful transplants can
be predicted will be required’’.
83 That is, the clinical benefits of HLA-typing were so
unclear thatitwas notcurrently justifiedasabasisfororgan allocation. Kissmeyer-Nielsen
strongly opposed this view. The difficulties in establishing correlation between match
grade and clinical results, which he believed to stem primarily from ‘‘inaccurate HL-A
typing ...should not be used as an excuse to disregard the HL-A system in relation to
clinical transplants’’.
84 Rather, the ‘‘complicated and expensive’’ work carried out by
organizations like Scandiatransplant should be continued, just as ‘‘research in all aspects
of HL-A typing should be given high priority’’.
85
Kissmeyer-Nielsen had good reasons for wanting to put an end to debates among
immunologists over the relevance of tissue typing. Within Scandiatransplant, reliance
upon histocompatibility was coming under attackin the early 1970s, mainlyfrom surgeons
and nephrologists. As mentioned above, Scandiatransplant had a remarkable initial suc-
cess, exchanging almost three-quarters of all cadaver kidneys in 1971. Yet in the follow-
ing years, statistical analyses of Scandiatransplant material showed poor correlation
between match grade and clinical results.
86 The results were never published, and the
reliance upon tissue typing was notopenly challenged at this time. But the statistics made a
strong impression on clinicians. The lack of correlation justified extensive use of kidneys
for local patients rather than sending grafts on to another centre. As a consequence,
transplant teams chose to disregard exchange criteria to such a degree that the exchange
rate through Scandiatransplant dropped to 35 per cent in 1975, half that of four years
earlier.
87 Exchange criteria in Scandiatransplant were loosened, and the Committee on
Dialysis and Transplantation even speculated that kidney exchange on a regional level
might soon come to an end.
88
Scandiatransplant survived, and exchange rates rose to around 50 per cent in the
late 1970s because of expectations concerning HLA-DR typing.
89 But it is clear that
two different attitudes toward organ allocation existed within the system of kidney
transplantation from the early 1970s onwards, and that immunologists and clinicians
took different sides. Next to the official policy of allocation on the basis of histocompat-
ibility, advocated mainly by immunologists, an alternative practice of kidney allocation
83Mickey, et al., op. cit., note 81 above, p. 57.
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Søren Bak-Jensenwas at times employed by clinicians. Kissmeyer-Nielsen believed ‘‘transplant surgeons’’
to be more than happy to disregard HLA in the allocation of kidneys.
90 And in 1982 he
recalled how ‘‘tissue typers in Scandinavia have experienced depressing episodes’’ as
reports suggesting a limited value of histocompatibility testing had brought ‘‘kidney
surgeons’’ to use more donor kidneys locally in non-compliance with exchange criteria.
91
Clinicians rarely put their criticism of tissue typing into words, and then only discreetly.
The Committee on Dialysis and Transplantation, which was dominated by urologists and
nephrologists, stated in 1973 that tissue typing played a ‘‘significantly smaller role’’ in
cadaver kidney transplantations than grafts from living related donors, thus moderating
the enthusiasm of their 1969 report.
92 Rather, clinicians chose simply to disregard
HLA in practice whenever they thought this justifiable, thus allowing the drop in
exchange rates in Scandiatransplant to speak for itself. A similar situation may be
observed in other countries. According to Jean Dausset, who headed France-Transplant
for the first twenty years of its existence, surgeons were always strongly opposed to HLA
and regional kidney exchange, even if they were unwilling to enter into an open dis-
cussion about the issue.
93 And Nicholas Tilney informs us that while tissue typers were
relatively unaffected by reports questioning the practical importance of HLA, surgeons
quietly bypassed tissue type laboratories in the allocation process.
94
In this way, a gap was apparent between the perspective of immunologists in
favour of regional kidney exchange and the outlook of clinicians who preferred
and sometimes practised local allocation. Even though the former view was domi-
nant, the 1970s can be seen as a period of confrontation between regional and local
perspectives in kidney allocation. Diverging preferences for organ allocation were to
play a central role in the changes that took place in Nordic kidney exchange in the
1980s, and it is worth taking a look at some of the factors that led doctors in different
directions.
A Struggle between Perspectives and Specialisms
In her analysis of sources of conflict in the Swedish transplantation system, Nora
Machado points to how tensions may arise because different groups of doctors involved
in the system have diverging priorities. Clinicians in transplant centres feel responsible for
local patients, while doctors primarily involved in kidney distribution focus on overall
efficiency.
95 Such differences in perspective were probably a central reason for diverging
attitudes towards regional kidney exchange. Disagreement was not over the use of immu-
nogenetic characteristics as criteria for kidney allocation. To the degree that tissue typing
had a positive influence on graft survival, clinicians were happy to use it.
96 Lo ¨wy argues
90Kissmeyer-Nielsen, ‘The HL-A system’,
op. cit., note 63 above, pp. 55–6.
91Idem, ‘Scandiatransplant – evolution and
development’, op. cit., note 55 above.
92Thaysen, op. cit., note 57 above, p. 113: ‘‘en
væsentligt mindre rolle’’.
93Dausset, op. cit., note 22 above, pp. 178–9.
94Tilney, op. cit., note 15 above, p. 138.
95Nora Machado, ‘Incongruence and tension in
complex organisations: the case of an organ
transplantation system’, Human Systems
Management, 1996, 15: 55–70, on pp. 64–5. On this
tension, see also Prottas, op. cit., note 3 above.
96A negative cross match, proving that the
recipient was not already immunized towards the
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Institutional Exchange of Cadaver Kidneys in Denmarkthat HLA was in fact attractive to clinicians because it defused potential conflicts with
patientsby‘‘naturalizing’’theallocationprocedure.
97Histocompatibilityofferedanappar-
ently neutral scientific guide for surgeons and nephrologists to refer to in ‘‘the delicate
political matter of organ allocation’’.
98 Lo ¨wy also suggests that the equality in access to
donor kidneys offered through reliance upon HLA was in line with the values guiding
health care provision in European countries.
99 Ole Fjeldborg, the most experienced kidney
transplant surgeon in Denmark, supported this view by stating that Scandinavians would
not accept allocation ‘‘on anything but biological grounds’’.
100
The question that divided immunologists and clinicians in Denmark, and probably also
elsewhere, was whether histocompatibility was so important that kidneys should be
exchanged between different transplant centres in order to achieve an optimal match.
Immunologists argued that regional kidney exchange was warranted even if well-matched
cadaver kidney grafts fared only slightly better than mismatched ones. For clinicians, such
minorbenefitswere seentocomewitharangeofdrawbacks,mainlybecauseorganizations
like Scandiatransplant interfered with the priorities of individual transplant centres. Clini-
cians were not able to concentrate on ‘‘their own’’ patients. And the fragmentation of the
transplantation process characteristic of regional kidney exchange meant that a transplant
centre might not receive as many kidneys as it procured.
Before the establishment of Scandiatransplant, cadaver kidneys for transplantations in
Denmark came from patients maintained on artificial circulation in the neurosurgical
department of the hospital where the transplant centre was located. The only selection
criterion was major blood group compatibility, and transplant centres could count on
finding a suitable recipient among their dialysis population for any donor kidney they
might procure. The recipient could be brought in, prepared, and anaesthetized before the
donor nephrectomy was carried out.
101 Kidney transplantations were thus performed in a
local framework and with a close connection in space, time, and quantity between pro-
curement and implantation of kidney grafts.
Scandiatransplant disrupted the direct link between procurement and transplantation. A
transplant centre did not have to procure a kidney in order to implant one, and, since grafts
might come from all over Scandinavia or even from other regions in Europe, donation and
transplantation depended on each other only in a very abstract way. As a consequence, the
actual process of donation and the number of kidneys procured by each centre was seen to
beoflittleimportanceinthemanagementofScandiatransplant.ThefirstScandiatransplant
report stated that ‘‘430 cadaver kidneys have been procured’’, 65 per cent of which were
tissue type of the donor, was always required, see
Tilney, op. cit., note 15 above, p. 138.
97Lo ¨wy, op. cit., note 17 above, p. 212; idem, op.
cit., note 25 above, p. 591.
98Hiesse, Pessione, and Houssin, op. cit., note 21
above, p. 623.
99Lo ¨wy, op. cit., note 17 above, pp. 212–13.
100Ole Fjeldborg, ‘Donorsituationen ved
organtransplantationer’, Ugeskrift for Læger, 1989,
151: 2532–4, on p. 2534: ‘‘pa ˚ andet end biologiske
forhold’’.
101Villy Posborg Petersen, et al.,
‘Nyretransplantation I’, Ugeskrift for Læger, 1966,
128: 723–33, on pp. 724–5; Villy Posborg Petersen,
et al., ‘Nyretransplantation II. Kirurgiske aspekter’,
UgeskriftforLæger,1966,128:733–40,onpp.734–5;
Bundegaard, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 26.
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Søren Bak-Jensensent on to another centre, and supplied information on histocompatibility and transplanta-
tion outcomes.
102 The institutional origin of donor kidneys was not considered relevant.
This was not so for transplant teams. Kidney procurement was a very real task in
individual hospitals, a time-consuming one, and not a very attractive one either. The
first major conflict in Denmark about kidney transplantation broke out as nurses from
the neuroanaesthetic department at A ˚rhus Municipal Hospital refused to participate in
deceased donor nephrectomies, which they deemed to be both illegal and unethical. The
nursesclaimedthatkidneyswereremovedwhilethedonorwasstillmaintainedonartificial
ventilation, and that relatives were not informed, or were even lied to, in order to allow the
nephrectomies to be carried out.
103 Medical doctors accused nurses of obstructing life-
saving operations, and the conflict threatened to bring transplantation activities at the
hospital to a halt.
104 Legislation regulating the donation of organs and tissue for trans-
plantation was rushed through the Danish parliament in 1967 in order to establish a firm
legal ground for these procedures, but a latent conflict between medical doctors and nurses
continued to influence kidney procurement for several years.
105 Even when things calmed
down, nephrectomies on deceased donors were still ‘‘the most unattractive operation one
might imagine’’, carried out in highly emotional circumstances and in a legal and ethical
grey area.
106 The only thing that merited the effort was the subsequent implantation of the
organ into a chronic uraemic patient. Chronic uraemics spend extended and repeated
periods of time in hospital and often build up personal ties with the staff. Just like the
procurement process, possible recipients of donor organs were very much faces to trans-
plant teams. There is, therefore, little reason to believe that clinicians lightly gave up donor
kidneys for transfer to another hospital.
107
Yet that was exactly what the Scandiatransplant organization required transplant centres
to do. And, to make matters worse, the donating institution could not count on receiving a
graft in return. Imbalances were visible from the very beginning of kidney exchange in the
Nordic countries. During the first three years of Scandiatransplant, Danish transplant
centres procured a total of 271 cadaver kidneys. Of these, 178 were sent to a centre in
another country, but since 317 transplants using cadaver kidneys were performed during
that period, Denmark imported over forty kidneys more from Scandiatransplant partners
102Kissmeyer-Nielsen, et al., op. cit., note 56
above, p. 1022.
103Legislation required the ventilator to be turned
offand cardiacarrestto occurbeforethe patient could
bepronounceddeadandtheorgansremoved.Standard
procedure in Danish transplant centres around 1970
was then to re-apply mechanical or manual heart
massage and perform the nephrectomy while
circulation was maintained, cf. Richard Malmros,
‘Om udvælgelse af donorer til transplantation’,
UgeskriftforLæger,1970,132:400–2.Onothersteps
taken by surgeons to limit warm ischaemia times
before the introduction of brain death criteria, see
Kootstra, op. cit., note 10 above, p. 59.
104Teddy Østerlin Koch, ‘Ulovlige
transplantationer’, Sygeplejersken, 1993, 93: 4–14.
Bundegaard, op. cit., note 6 above, pp. 77–83. Brain
death criteria were not introduced in Denmark until
1991.
105Lov om udtagelse af menneskeligt væv (Law
concerning the excision of human tissue). SIL, JHT,
CDT, 21 Nov. 1972.
106Jørgen Kvist Kristensen, interview by author,
15 May 2006. Kvist Kristensen (b. 1937) has been
involved as a surgeon in donor nephretomies and
transplantations from the mid-1960s, first at the
urologicaldepartmentatGentofteHospitalandlaterat
the National Hospital in Copenhagen, where he now
heads the urological clinic.
107I have no detailed information on whether
relatives were informed of the possibility that the
organs they allowed to be donated might be sent to
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108 Differences existed between the procurement and exchange rates of
the different Danish centres. A ˚rhus Municipal Hospital procured sixty-two kidneys and
transferred twenty of them to hospitals outside Denmark. The Copenhagen region, num-
bering two transplant centres, procured 117 kidneys during the same period and exported
half of them. By 1976, the situation had only become more uneven. Danish transplant
centres were using far more kidneys than they procured, with the transplant centres in
SwedenandNorwaydoing muchofthe exporting.
109The deficit continuedtogrow,sothat
by the end of 1981 Danish transplant teams had received a total of 317 kidneys more from
Scandiatransplant partners than they had transferred.
110
The clinicians found this situation difficult to accept. Objections were voiced in private
circles during the 1970s, but the complaints seem to have carried little weight during that
decade.
111 Within the rationality of the HLA-hypothesis promoted by Kissmeyer-Nielsen
and other tissue typers, such a deficit was largely accidental. Scandiatransplant did have a
rule that kidneys should be repaid in kind within six months.
112 But since transplant teams
had no control over the tissue types of the kidneys they procured, they could not be held
responsible if they failed to repay kidneys. Official reports from Scandiatransplant never
touched upon the growing problem of imbalances in kidney exchange.
113 The reliance
upon tissue typing thus overlooked and even naturalized a potentially uneven way of
distributing organs between institutions, even as the dissatisfaction of clinicians grew.
By the early 1980s, it was clear that tensions over such imbalances were reaching a critical
point. The Danish Committee on Dialysis and Transplantation acknowledged in 1981 that
Swedish and Norwegian frustrations over the Danish kidney debt ‘‘threatened cooperation
within the Scandiatransplant organization in a serious way’’.
114 Regional kidney exchange
thus appeared to be under pressure. Within a couple of years, calls for a revision of kidney
allocation practices gained momentum and legitimacy from the introduction of a new
immunosuppressant drug, cyclosporine.
Cyclosporine and the Legitimacy of Local Priorities
In 1982, a European multicentre trial of cyclosporine showed marked improvements in
kidney graft survival. A one-year graft survival rate of around 80 per cent could be
anotherhospital.Yettheexchangeofkidneysbetween
different hospitals may have influenced relatives in
their decision to allow donation or not, and may
consequently have made it more difficult for doctors
and nurses involved to obtain consent.
108SIL, JHT, Scandiatransplant Necroreport, 1
Jan. 1969–31 Mar. 1972.
109SIL, JHT, Scandiatransplant Necroreport, 1
Jan. 1969–30 Sep. 1976.
110SIL, JHT, Balance i nekronyreudveksling, 1
Jan. 1969–31 Dec. 1981.
111SIL, JHT, CDT, 8 Oct. 1981.
112Madsen, op. cit., note 8 above, p. 79.
113Lars U Lamm, ‘Activity and follow-up 1978’,
Scand.J.Urol.Nephrol.Suppl.,1980,54:6–10;idem,
‘Scandiatransplant – 1980: activity and follow-up’,
Scand. J. Urol. Nephrol. Suppl.,1981, 64: 16–28. The
last report actually included a table showing the
imbalances between the centres, but this was not
commented on in the text.
114SIL, JHT, CDT, 8 Oct. 1981: ‘‘truerpa ˚ alvorlig
ma ˚de samarbejdet indenfor Skandiatransplant-
organisationen’’. In France, surgeons and
anaesthesiologists openly suggested a stronger local
basis for kidney allocation, with immunologists like
Jean Dausset strongly opposing a weakening of
regional exchange, cf. Rene ´ K€ uss, et al.,
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Søren Bak-Jensenexpected, compared to the 40 to 60 per cent that had proved to be the limit with traditional
immunosuppressants.
115 In Denmark, transplant centres reacted with guarded optimism,
but the first Danish report on the effects of the drug confirmed previous findings.
116
With cyclosporine, transplantation results did not seem to be affected by histo-
compatibility. A high survival rate was achieved irrespective of tissue type match.
Therefore, the number of suitable recipients for a given donor kidney grew drama-
tically with the advent of cyclosporine, making it likely that any transplant team
w o u l df i n dam a t c ha m o n gt h e i ro w nd i a l y s i spopulation. With these characteristics,
cyclosporine played into the hands of clinicians favouring the local allocation of
donor kidneys. Through reference to the new drug, an apparently disinterested attack
could be launched on regional kidney exchange and the dominance of the tissue
typers. Jørgen Ladefoged, chief nephrologist at the National Hospital, quickly fore-
saw that ‘‘with the use of cyclosporine ...the time-consuming exchange of kidneys
between European countries and within Scandinavia, which has so far been necessary
in order to achieve optimally histocompatible kidneys, will decrease markedly’’.
117
Similar predictions were voiced internationally, with many early observers arguing that
with cyclosporine, regional organ exchange would be at best irrelevant but most likely
harmful to graft survival. The drug was shown to be nephrotoxic in humans, a side effect
that was reported to worsen if kidneys were preserved outside the body for extended
periods, as was the case in regional kidney exchange.
118 One report even presented data
that showed superior graft survival for unmatched kidneys with the use of cyclospor-
ine.
119 In the cyclosporine era, kidney exchange organizations and tissue typing labora-
tories seemed destined to play a more marginal role.
The new conditions for kidney exchange imposed by cyclosporine forced Scandiatrans-
plant onto the defensive in the early 1980s. In 1985, the organization decided to all but
abandon the exchange of kidneys on the basis of HLA-match, leading to a steep decline in
‘Les pre ´levements de reins encore insuffisants: vers
une re ´gionalisation de la transplantation’, Bulletin de
l’Acade ´mie Nationale de Me ´decine, 1981, 165: 381–
94. For K€ uss, regionalization was opposed to national
cooperation. On conflicts between transplant centres
in France, see Ilana Lo ¨wy and Anne Marie Moulin,
‘Du don a ` l’e ´change. Les institutions de
transplantation’, Culture Technique, 1985, 15:
157–63, on p. 163.
115Brent, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 316–18;
Tilney, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 236–8.
116Hans Dieperink, Niels Erik Frandsen, and
Ejvind Kemp, ‘Cyklosporin A. Lysere tider for
organtransplantationer?’, Ugeskrift for Læger, 1983,
145: 2749–52; Vagn Andersen, ‘Immunsuppression:
nye udviklinger’, Ugeskrift for Læger, 1983, 145:
2775–6; Bundegaard, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 116;
Søren Madsen, et al., ‘Kliniske resultater af
immunosuppression med cyklosporin A ved
nekronyretransplantation’, Ugeskrift for Læger, 1984,
146: 951–4.
117Jørgen Ladefoged, ‘Cyklosporin-A. Bedre
resultater ved nyretransplantation’, Ugeskrift for
Læger, 1984, 146: 989–90, on p. 990: ‘‘anvendelse af
cyklosporin vil ogsa ˚ betyde, at den tidrøvende
udveksling af nyrer mellem de europæiske lande og
indenfor Skandinavien, som hidtil har været
nødvendig for at opna ˚ optimalt
vævstypeoverensstemmende nyrer, vil aftage
betydeligt’’. Similar predictions of the organizational
implications of the new immunosuppressant were
voiced internationally, see Roy Yorke Calne, ‘Organ
transplantation:fromlaboratorytoclinic’,Br.med.J.,
1985, 291: 1751–4; Moulin, op. cit., note 18 above,
p. 223.
118Ladefoged, op. cit., note 117 above, p. 990.
A Danish trial of cyclosporine was not able to
confirm this finding, see Madsen, et al., op. cit.,
note 116 above, p. 953.
119K R Harris, et al., ‘Azathioprine and
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needed?’, Lancet, 1985, 326: 802–4.
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120Evenwithsuchloosenedguidelinesfororganexchange,non-compliance
with exchange criteria became widespread.
121 The disruption of Nordic kidney exchange
was certainly not to the benefit of Danish transplant teams, who had relied heavily upon
kidneys from other hospitals. Even before cyclosporine was widely introduced, the Com-
mittee on Dialysis and Transplantation had realized that Danish centres would have to
procure more kidneys locally, both in order to secure the supply of donor organs in case
Scandiatransplant came to an end and in order to pay back Denmark’s kidney debt.
122 In
1984, the Danishhealth authorities agreed to remunerate transplant centres foreverydonor
nephrectomycarriedout,andtheCommitteeonDialysisandTransplantationrecommended
that transplant centres should be allowed to hire surgeons to form teams that couldtravel to
hospitals in the local area and collect kidneys from suitable donors there.
123 Not everyone
abandoned the idea of regional kidney exchange as a solution to organ shortage, but this
approach had little support. In 1986, suggestions were made for the establishment of
Dantransplant,acooperationbetweenDanishtransplantcentresfortheexchangeofkidneys
on the basis of HLA-DR match, but nothing came of these plans.
124 The local and clinical
aspects of kidney transplantation thus gained in importance in the mid-1980s, with around
85 per cent of all cadaver kidneys now being used at the hospital where they were procured
and allocated according to criteria established by local clinicians.
Other European exchange organizations also went through fundamental changes in the
1980s, resulting in less reliance upon HLA.
125 Eurotransplant and France-Transplant
gradually changed their objectives and functions from being mainly organ allocation
organizations playing a central and indispensable role in the day-to-day functioning of
kidney transplant services to being organizations largely for monitoring transplantation
activities and supplying material for the study of factors important in clinical outcomes.
126
Changes were also visible in the relations of power and prestige between immunologists
and clinicians. Moulin recounts how surgeons forcefully distanced themselves from tissue
typing and the role played by immunologists in kidney allocation.
127 In the opinion of
Jean Dausset, surgeons backed by cyclosporine were offensively bold towards tissue
typers in their process of liberation ‘‘from the constraint of HLA’’ that they had always
120G Lundgren, et al., ‘HLA-matching and
pretransplant blood transfusions in cadaveric renal
transplantation: a changing picture with cyclosporin’,
Lancet, 1986, 2: 66–9, on p. 68.
121Nils HPersson,F Pedersen, andLars ULamm,
‘Compliance with the rules of kidney exchange in
Scandiatransplant’, Transplant. Proc., 1992, 24: 339.
122SIL, JHT, CDT, 25 Mar. 1982.
123SIL, JHT, Notat om drøftelser og
hovedkonklusioner fra et møde i Sundhedsstyrelsen
den 29. maj 1984 vedrørende etablering af
udrykningshold til nyreudtagning. See also Jes
Søgaard, Cost-effectiveness analyse af etablering af
udrykningshold og ny immunsuppressiv behandling
af nyretransplanterede patienter ved Cyclosporin A,
Odense Universitet, 1984.
124SIL, JHT, CDT, 6 Feb. 1986. Ole Fjeldborg,
interviewbyauthor,16June2006.Fjeldborg(b.1928)
was the surgeon who performed the first kidney
transplantationin Denmark. He spenthis entire career
at A ˚rhus Municipal Hospital, performing most of the
kidney transplantations there and also carrying out
important work in the organization of kidney
procurement in the local area. He retired in 1991.
125Lamm, op. cit., note 11 above. Lamm also
shows how the need to deal with organs other than
kidneys led Eurotransplant to develop new
procedures. As a rule, hearts, lungs, and livers were
exchanged through direct contact between local
centres, while kidneys were still allocated by the
central office.
126Braun,Feuerstein,andvonGrote-Janz,op.cit.,
note 16 above, pp. 457, 468.
127Moulin, op. cit., note 18 above, p. 223.
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Søren Bak-Jensenfelt uncomfortable with.
128 His frustration is understandable to a certain degree. Within a
few years, both the detrimental effects of prolonged ischemia times and of tissue type
matching in combination with cyclosporine were called into question.
129 But by then the
previous relationship between the immunological and other perspectives could not be
reinstated. The debate over the relevance of tissue typing continued, but in a new manner.
Immunology now provided only one perspective among many in the process of cadaver
kidney allocation.
Conclusion
The decrease in regional kidney exchange in Scandinavia was tied to the advent of
cyclosporine even as changes in kidney allocation were beginning to happen. As shown
atthebeginningofthispaper,theintroductionofthisnewimmunosuppressanthassincethen
been seen as the main cause of the change from a regional to a local perspective in cadaver
kidney allocation. Yet the study of developments in kidney allocation in Denmark demon-
strateshowdivergingperspectivesandprioritiesamongdifferentgroupsofdoctorsplayedan
important part in the changes in regional kidney exchange in the 1980s, and thus brings into
questiontheroleplayedbycyclosporine.Changeswerenotbroughtaboutasadirectresultof
pharmacological innovations. Cyclosporine was introduced at a time when conflict between
immunologists favouring regional kidney exchange and clinicians focused on conditions at
local transplant centres was reaching a climax. Tensions had been mounting throughout the
1970s, and even though immunologists and tissue type laboratories held a dominantposition
in the kidney transplantation system, clinicians sometimes disregarded exchange rules and
allocated organs locally, thus maintaining an alternative to regional kidney exchange. This
alternative was not created by the advent of cyclosporine. Rather, the new drug legitimized
the views held by clinicians dissatisfied with the dominant system. Cyclosporine was woven
into the struggle between different doctors working on different aspects of kidney trans-
plantationandholdingopposingviewsofhowtoallocatedonororgans.Toadegree,thedrug
was shaped to serve the interests of one of these factions.
The Danish case thus corresponds with the view of innovation and change in medicine
presented in several historicalstudiesfromthe early 1990s onwards.Theinnovationbrought
about by cyclosporine was constituted through a range of social and cultural factors. Yet the
Danish case does not suggest that norms and values regarding access to health care services,
as discussed by Lo ¨wy and Moulin, played the primary role in changing the structure of
institutional kidney exchange. Whether they were immunologists or surgeons, doctors in
Danish transplant centres worked in the same health care system and still managed to hold
opposingviews on the relevance oftissuetyping and regionalkidneyexchange. The conflict
between different doctors was not over whether equality should be the guiding principle in
health care provision, but rather over the level at which equality should be sought. And
finally, these broad socio-cultural values did not go through abrupt changes against which
changes in kidney allocation in the 1980s can be mapped.
128Dausset, op. cit., note 22 above, p. 183: ‘‘la
contrainte du HLA’’.
129Gerhard Opelz, ‘The benefit of exchanging
donor kidneys among transplant centers’, N. Engl. J.
Med., 1988, 318: 1289–92.
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Institutional Exchange of Cadaver Kidneys in DenmarkThe Danish case does not, however, suggest that we should completely discard phar-
macology or broad socio-cultural values in our understanding of the decrease in regional
kidney exchange. Cyclosporine did not cause changes in organ allocation in any direct
way, but it is clear that the alternative of local allocation gained decisive momentum when
presented in the guise of immunosuppressive innovation. Therefore, even if professional
struggles are accepted as an important dynamic in the history of organ allocation, it is
difficult to explain why opposition from clinicians caused a revision of exchange criteria in
the 1980s when it failed to do so at an earlier date without allowing for a degree of agency
on the part of cyclosporine. The drug seems to have offered a unique opportunity to
present a socio-professional demand as a neutral scientific imperative, and the historical
circumstances that allowed this merit further investigation. Also, in the 1970s climate of
uncertainty regarding the actual role of HLA in kidney transplantations, an adherence
among all kinds of doctors to the ideal of equality in access to health care services is likely
to have made an apparently neutral allocation process on the basis of histocompatibility
more attractive than the local alternative, which might more easily be seen as arbitrary.
Such an interpretation may also go some way towards explaining another interesting feature
of the history of kidney allocation in Denmark, namely the divide between official dis-
course and actual practice that existed through the 1970s. Repeated affirmations of the
benefits of tissue typing went hand in hand with frequent disregard for histocompatibility
in the allocation process. We might argue that the ‘‘non-scientific’’ ideal of equality in
health care provision stressed by Lo ¨wy and Moulin prevented an alignment of discourse
and practice. Such an interpretation would, however, have as a premise that a gap between
the actions and attitudes of different doctors is an anomaly that requires explanation.
Another approach would argue that the existence of different, even contradictory, view-
points is the norm within complex systems of cooperation.
130 In the latter perspective, our
interest should focus on how intra-professional differences have been handled in the
history of kidney sharing in general, and not just in the 1970s.
In sum, the history of kidney allocation in Denmark presents a more complex image of
the dynamics involved in this area than has previously been described, and points to new
questions. One way to pursue these questions would be to compare the Danish case with
thatofkidneyexchange inothercountriesandregions.As noted,theDanishframeworkfor
kidney allocation differed from that of other countries on several points, for example in the
way that kidney transplantation organization was strongly influenced by health care
authorities.
131 For this reason, differing perspectives among doctors may have been rela-
tively less important for developments in Denmark than in countries with less govern-
mental control. In any case, the focus on tensions between different groups of doctors
rather than ongeneral factors, be they pharmacological innovations or broad socio-cultural
values, suggests that further studies of how the institutional exchange of organs for
transplantation has unfolded in different regions are desirable.
130This is indeedthe startingpointin SusanLeigh
Star and James R Griesemer, ‘Institutional ecology,
‘‘translations’’ and boundary objects: amateurs and
professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate
Zoology,1907–39’,Soc.Stud.Sci.,1989,19:387–420.
131For a comparative study on the diffusion of
medical technology with special attention to different
levels of control, see Thomas Schlich, ‘Degrees
of control: the spread of operative fracture treatment
with metal implants: a comparative perspective on
Switzerland, East Germany and the USA,
1950s–1990s’,inStanton(ed.),op.cit.,note19above,
pp. 106–25.
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Søren Bak-Jensen